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Abstract— We discuss current trends in the development and
use of high-confidence medical cyber-physical systems (MCPS).
These trends, including increased reliance on software to deliver
new functionality, wider use of network connectivity in MCPS,
and demand for continuous patient monitoring, bring new
challenges into the process of MCPS development and at the same
time create new opportunities for research and development.
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical device industry is undergoing a rapid transfor-
mation, embracing the potential of embedded software and
network connectivity. Instead of stand-alone devices that can
be designed, certified, and used to treat patients independently
of each other, we will be faced in the near future with dis-
tributed systems that simultaneously control multiple aspects
of the patient’s physiology. The combination of embedded
software controlling the devices, networking capabilities, and
complicated physical dynamics that patient bodies exhibit
makes modern medical device systems a distinct class of
cyber-physical systems, which we refer to as medical CPS
(MCPS).
Development of safe and effective MCPS will require
new design, verification, and validation techniques, due to
increased size and complexity. Model-based technology should
play a larger role in the MCPS design. Models should cover
devices and communications between them, but also, equally
importantly, patients and caregivers.
In addition, MCPS will require a new regulatory procedure
to approve their use for treating patients. On the one hand,
the traditional process-based regulatory regime used currently
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to approve
medical devices is becoming too lengthy and will be pro-
hibitively expensive with the increased MCPS complexity. It
threatens to overwhelm FDA resources to process and evaluate
submissions in a manner that is both timely and rigorous. At
the same time, device manufacturers are often operating under
strict time-to-market pressures and soon small innovation-
driven companies will not be able to afford the effort of
preparing submissions to FDA.
In this paper, we summarize current technological trends
in the area and discuss the challenges that arise from these
trends. Our view is that the challenges brought by the recent
trends present new opportunities for researchers in MCPS and
in general embedded and CPS systems.
Research is supported in part by the National Science Foundation grants
CNS-0834524 and CNS-0930647.
II. BACKGROUND AND TRENDS
While software-intensive medical devices such as infusion
pumps, ventilators, and patient monitors have been used for a
long time, the field of medical devices is currently undergoing
a rapid transformation. The changes under way bring new
challenges to the development of high-confidence medical
devices, but at the same time they open new opportunities
for the research community [14]. The main trends that have
emerged can be summarized as follows:
a) New software-enabled functionality: Following the
general trend in the field of embedded systems, introduction of
the new functionality is largely driven by the new possibilities
that software-based development of medical device systems
is offering. A prime example of the new functionality is
seen in the area of robotic surgery, which requires real-time
processing of high-resolution images and haptic feedback.
Another example is proton therapy treatment. It is one of
the most technology-intensive procedures and requires one
of the largest-scale medical device systems. Used to deliver
precise doses of radiation for cancer patients, the treatment
requires precise guiding of the proton beam from a cyclotron to
patients, requiring adaptation to even minor shifts in position.
Higher precision of the treatment, compared to conventional
radiation therapy, allows higher radiation doses to be ap-
plied. This, in turn, places more stringent requirements on
patient safety. Control of proton beams is subject to very
tight timing constraints, with much less tolerance than for
most medical devices. To further complicate the problem,
the same beam is applied to multiple patient locations and
needs to be switched from location to location, opening up the
possibility of interference between beam scheduling and beam
application. In addition to the proton beam control, a highly
critical function of software in a proton treatment system is
real-time image processing to determine precise position of the
patient and detect any patient movement. In [19], the authors
have analyzed the safety of proton therapy machines, however
their analysis concentrates on a single system, the emergency
shutdown. In general, proper analysis and validation of such
large and complex systems remains one of the big challenges
facing the medical device industry.
b) Increased connectivity of medical devices: In addition
to relying more and more on software, medical devices are
increasingly equipped with network interfaces. Interconnected
medical devices, effectively, form a distributed medical device
system of a larger scale and complexity that has to be properly
designed and validated to ensure effectiveness and patient
safety. Today, the networking capabilities of medical devices
are primarily used for patient monitoring (through local con-
nection of individual devices to integrated patient monitors
or for remote monitoring in a tele-ICU [20] setting) and for
interaction with electronic health records to store patient data.
The networking capabilities of most medical devices today
are limited in functionality and tend to rely on proprietary
communication protocols offered by major vendors. There is,
however, a growing realization among clinical professionals
that open interoperability between different medical devices
will lead to improved patient safety and new treatment pro-
cedures. Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) Interoper-
ability initiative [6] is a relatively recent effort that aims to
provide an open standards framework for safe and flexible
interconnectivity of medical devices, in order to improve
patient safety and health care efficiency. In addition to develop-
ing interoperability standards, MD PnP initiative collects and
demonstrates clinical scenarios where interoperability leads to
improvement over the existing practice.
One example that illustrates how patient safety can be
improved by MD PnP is the interaction between an X-
ray machine and a ventilator. Consider the scenario taken
from [15]. X-ray images are often taken during surgical
operations. If the operation is being performed under general
anesthesia, the patient is breathing with the help of a ventilator.
Because the ventilator cannot “hold its breath” to let the
X-ray image be taken without the blur caused by moving
lungs, the ventilator has to be paused and later restarted.
There have been cases where the ventilator was not restarted,
leading to the death of the patient. Interoperation of the two
devices can be used in several ways to ensure that patient
safety is not compromised, as discussed in [3]. One possibility
is to let the X-ray machine pause and restart the ventilator
automatically. A safer alternative, although presenting tighter
timing constraints, is to let the ventilator transmit its internal
state to the X-ray machine. There typically is enough time to
take an X-ray image at the end of the breathing cycle, when
the patient has finished exhaling until the start of the next
inhalation. This approach requires the X-ray machine to know
precisely the instance when the air flow rate becomes close
enough to zero and the time when the next inhalation starts.
Then, it can make the decision to take a picture if enough time
– taking transmission delays into account – is available.
c) Physiologically closed-loop systems: Traditionally,
most clinical scenarios have a caregiver – and often more than
one – controlling the process. For example, an anesthesiologist
monitors sedation of a patient during an operation and decides
when an action to adjust the flow of sedative needs to be
taken. There is a concern in the medical community that such
reliance on “human in the loop” may compromise patient
safety. Caregivers, who are often overworked and operate
under severe time pressure, may miss a critical warning sign.
Nurses typically care for multiple patients at a time and can be
distracted at a wrong moment. Using an automatic controller
to provide continuous monitoring of the patient state and
handling of routine situations would be a big relief to the
caregiver and can improve patient care and safety. Although
the computer will probably never replace the caregiver com-
pletely, it can significantly reduce the workload, calling the
caregiver’s attention only when something out of the ordinary
happens.
Scenarios based on physiological closed-loop control have
been used in the medical device industry for some time. How-
ever, their application has been mostly limited to implantable
devices that cover relatively well understood body organs,
such as the heart in the case of pacemakers and defibrillators.
Implementing closed-loop scenarios in distributed medical
device systems is a relatively new idea that has not made its
way to the mainstream practice.
A clinical scenario that can easily benefit from the closed-
loop approach is patient-controlled analgesia (PCA). PCA
infusion pumps are commonly used to deliver opioids for
pain management, for instance after surgery. Patients have
very different reactions to the medications and require very
different dosages and delivery schedules. PCA pumps give
the patient a button to press to request a dose when they
decide they want it rather than using a schedule fixed by a
caregiver. Some patients may decide they prefer a higher level
of pain to the nausea the drugs may cause and can press the
button less often, while patients who need a higher dose can
press it more often. A major problem with opioid medications
in general is that an excessive dose can cause respiratory
failure. A properly programmed PCA system should not allow
an overdose because it is programmed with limits on how
many doses it will deliver, regardless of how often the button
is pushed. However, this safety mechanism is not sufficient
to protect all patients. Some patients still receive overdoses
if the pump is misprogrammed, if the pump programmer
overestimates the maximum dose a patient can receive, if the
wrong concentration of drug is loaded into the pump, or if
someone other than the patient presses the button (PCA-by-
proxy), among other causes. PCA infusion pumps are currently
involved in a large number of adverse events, and existing
safeguards such as drug libraries and programmable limits
are not adequate to address all the scenarios seen in clinical
practice [18].
In [4], we studied a PCA system that contains a supervisor
to monitor patient data for the early signs of respiratory failure.
The supervisor can stop the infusion and sound an alarm if the
patient experiences an adverse event. We use a pulse oximeter
device that receives physiological signals from a clip on the
patient’s finger and processes them to calculate heart rate
and SpO2 outputs1. Figure 1 shows the devices and essential
data flow in this control loop. The pulse oximeter receives
physiological signals from the patient and processes them to
produce heart rate and SpO2 outputs. The supervisor gets these
outputs and makes a control decision, possibly sending a stop
signal to the PCA pump. The PCA pump delivers a drug to
1SpO2 is the measure of blood oxygenation, an important indicator of the
heart activity.
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the patient at its programmed rate unless it is stopped by the
supervisor. The patient model gets the drug rate as an input
and calculates the level of drug in the patient’s body. This
in turn influences the physiological output signals through a
drug absorption function. Figure 1 also identifies the sources of
delays in the control loop that the supervisor needs to account
for. The supervisor also needs to be tolerant to faults that
interfere with the control loop, in particular communication
failures between the devices.
d) Continuous Monitoring and Care: Due to a high cost
associated with in-hospital care, there has been increasing
interest in alternatives such as home care, assisted living,
telemedicine, and sport-activity monitoring. Mobile monitor-
ing and home monitoring of vital signs and physical activities
allow health to be assessed remotely at all times. Also, there
is a growing popularity of sophisticated technologies such
as body sensor networks to measure training effectiveness
and athletic performance based on physiological data such
as heart rate, breathing rate, blood-sugar level, stress level,
and skin temperature. However, most of the current systems
operate in store-and-forward mode, with no real-time diag-
nostic capability. Physiologically closed-loop technology will
allow diagnostic evaluation of vital signs in real-time and make
constant care possible.
III. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
As can be seen from the trends described in Section II, the
cross-cutting nature of Medical CPS (MCPS) transcends the
informational, physical, and medical worlds, and raises sig-
nificant scientific and technical challenges for the IT, medical,
regulatory communities. Here are some of the challenges that
are envisioned for the next ten years. These challenges in turn
provide opportunities for R&D communities.
e) Executable clinical workflows: The trend towards
increased interconnectivity and interoperability of medical
devices opens the way for the dynamic construction and
deployment of MCPS to implement custom clinical scenarios
that best suit the needs of a given patient. Dynamism in MCPS
deployment, in turn, poses a new challenge for ensuring patient
safety in these custom scenarios. While safety analysis of
dynamically created scenarios is an open problem, one can
envision a possible path to the solution based on rigorous
modeling of clinical scenarios and their subsequent analysis.
A language for describing clinical scenarios should specify
• devices necessary for the implementation of the scenario;
• requirements for data flows between the devices and the
patient;
• caregiver roles required for the scenario;
• operational procedures for each caregiver role, including
actions necessary to compose the devices, program them
(e.g., set infusion rates), and carry the scenario out; and
possibly
• decision logic for the closed-loop control between de-
vices.
Clinical scenario workflows should be given precise opera-
tional semantics. Analysis of such precise descriptions of a
scenario will allow to make sure that instructions for caregivers
are unambiguous and cover all possible situations; ensure that
devices can interact with each other as desired; explore the
effects of faults and user errors. Furthermore, a model of
the scenario can be compiled into run-time components that
will provide decision support for caregivers, detect device
incompatibilities, and help recover from faults.
f) Model-based Development: With executable clinical
workflow specifications, MCPS present a unique opportunity
in the area of model-based development. We can introduce
modeling beyond individual devices or even device systems,
to the level of clinical scenarios that would serve as top-
level system requirements. As discussed above, there is a
trend towards dynamic composition and deployment of a
medical device system for a given clinical scenario. Analysis
of scenario models will allow us to assess patient safety in a
scenario before a device system for the scenario is built, and
generate requirements for the devices that can be safely used
in a scenario implementation and interconnections between
them. Such requirements can then be checked during deploy-
ment, ensuring safety of the implementation. The challenge,
however, is precisely specifying the interface between static
and dynamic safety checks.
g) Physiological close-loop control: The use of auto-
matic control in clinical scenarios raises the stakes for the
application of control theory in medical applications. Medi-
cal device systems for patients with complicated conditions
may involve application of several treatments simultaneously,
which affect several body systems in complicated and often
insufficiently understood ways. These treatments also can
interfere with each other. Effects of each treatment can differ
widely from patient to patient. Critical variables are often
not directly observable, adding to the uncertainty. Control-
theoretic methods designed to operate under high parametric
uncertainty, such as supervisory adaptive control [17], may be
helpful in this context.
h) Patient Modeling and Simulation: A closely related
challenge is that of patient modeling. Patient models are
needed for the design of closed-loop control, as well as for
the safety analysis of scenarios. For example, the closed-loop
PCA scenario requires us to model drug absorption by the
patient body as well as the relationship between the drug
dose and concentration, on the one hand, and patient vital
signs, such as heart and respiratory rates, on the other hand.
Pharmacokinetic models of drug absorption are known from
the literature (e.g., [16]), and there is statistical data on the
effect of the drug on vital signs. However, comprehensive
models are too complex to be used in the design and analysis,
thus development of new abstraction techniques is paramount
for addressing this challenge. At the same time, high-fidelity
models and efficient simulators for them are needed for testing
and validation of MCPS.
i) Adaptive Patient-Specific Algorithms and Smart
Alarms: Medical devices are typically designed for groups
of patients with similar medical conditions. However, the
staggering range of patient responses to the same treatment
and variation of vital signs for the same condition make
this approach very generic and inefficient. For example, most
medical devices are capable of triggering alarms when a
potentially dangerous situation is detected. However, since
alarm triggering conditions are aimed at an “average” patient,
we are faced with a proliferation of false alarms that try to
divert caregiver’s attention to insignificant issues. The result
is the well-known alarm fatigue that caregivers commonly
experience, which makes them stop paying attention to device
alarms and potentially missing important cases.
Network connectivity in medical devices and increasing
availability of electronic health records (EHR) makes it pos-
sible to develop adaptive algorithms that will be attuned to
the unique parameters of a given patient. For example, well-
trained athletes can have heart rates that would be considered
abnormal in most patients. Having the patient’s exercise his-
tory from the EHR will let the system adjust alarm thresholds,
reducing false alarms.
Another opportunity offered by interconnected devices is
to correlate alarms raised by different devices in the system
and use multivariate trends to provide “smart alarms,” further
reducing false alarms. To give a trivial example, a sudden drop
in SpO2 readings may mean that a patient is experiencing a
heart failure. But if blood pressure readings remain normal,
the more likely cause cause of the problem is a disconnected
wire – which is a problem that needs to be fixed but has a
much lesser degree of emergency than a heart failure.
j) User-Centered Design: Caregiver errors in using med-
ical devices are a major source of adverse events [9], [23].
Undoubtedly, some of these errors are due to stress and
overload that caregivers experience daily. However, a large
number of these errors can be attributed to poor user interface
design. If a device is hard to operate, has a counterintuitive
interface, or responds to user inputs in an unexpected manner,
user errors are much easier to occur. Design and validation of
medical devices needs to take into account user expectations.
To use model-based design for interactive medical devices,
we have to incorporate models of caregiver behavior. Such
user modeling is a notoriously challenging problem. However,
incorporating information about likelihood of certain actions
into caregiver models opens the way to quantitative reasoning
about device safety.
k) Infrastructure for Medical-Device Integration and In-
teroperation: Currently, distributed MCPS are built by a sin-
gle manufacturer using proprietary communication protocol.
While this approach may make regulatory approval easier, it
limits the benefits of inter-device communication and stifles
creativity of medical professionals [11]. Open interconnec-
tivity standards for MCPS, such as the ICE [5] standard
proposed via the MD PnP initiative, lay the groundwork for
medical device interoperability. Yet, for these standards to be
effective, development and deployment platforms should be
developed. A recent development in this area is the open-
source MCDF toolset [13]. MCDF has been shown to be
useful in the development of closed-loop MCDF. However, it is
based on the relatively heavy-weight Java Messaging System.
More nimble deployment platforms, designed to be amenable
to verification, may ease regulatory approval of MCPS.
l) Compositionality: Since interoperable network-
enabled medical devices will increasingly be composed into
MCPS in a dynamic fashion, compositional reasoning is
the only rigorous way to ensure safety of such systems.
Techniques like temporal induction [21], which allows sound
circular compositional reasoning between mutually dependent
interacting devices in a scenario, may be useful in this
case. A particularly challenging problem is predicting the
possibilities of unexpected interactions between devices in the
system. In particular, devices providing different treatments
to the same patient may incur radio interference because of
close proximity to each other. More importantly, treatments
themselves can interfere with each other by affecting
physiological responses [8]. Discovering these interferences,
of course, is the subject of biomedical research. However,
MCPS designers should be aware of these interferences and
ensure that the system providing a treatment is made aware
of potentially interfering treatments through sufficient context
information.
As an illustration, consider the following “mixed critical-
ity” scenario. Measurement of mean arterial pressure (MAP)
depends on the relative position of the patient and sensor.
Thus, when the patient’s bed (which is a Class I medical
device, lowest criticality in the FDA classification) is raised,
the MAP reading changes. If the MAP sensor is part of a
system providing continuous monitoring that follows trends
in patient vital signs, the sudden change may trigger false
alarms or unwarranted actions. This problem may be addressed
by supplying additional context information to the monitoring
system. For example, an additional event can be added to
signify that bed height has changed. The system, then, can
correlate that event with the change in the MAP reading and
suppress the alarm. The design challenge is to identify and
provide all sources of interactions as explicit inputs to the
system.
m) Security and Privacy: While networking capabilities
let medical devices acquire functionality that was never pos-
sible previously, they also open the door to a host of new
potential problems. Security and privacy concerns are some of
those new problems [1]. An attacker who penetrates an MCPS
network has the potential to harm and even kill patients by
reprogramming devices [7]. The extreme approach, taken by
most device manufacturers today, is to limit the functionality
that can be invoked through the network interface. In most
cases, the device can send out data, such as sensor readings
or event logs, but not accept commands from the network.
Although such an approach improves security of the system,
it severely limits the ability to deploy closed-loop scenarios.
Finding the right balance between flexibility and security is
an important challenge for MCPS. Extensive solution have
been developed to address security and privacy concerns for
electronic health records. These solutions are currently being
extended to MCPS [22], but the problem is far from being
solved.
n) Verification, Validation and Certification: Current de-
sign practice places certification and verification at the end
of the design cycle, when it is frequently too late to change
design choices. As medical devices become more complex and
more interconnected, it is becoming increasingly evident that
verification and certification should be incorporated in early
design stages. This can be done in two ways: on the one hand,
the “design for verification” approach [2] can help verification
techniques scale better and make generation of verification
evidence easier. On the other hand, model-based generative
techniques allow to perform verification early in the design
and then extend the guarantees provided by verification to the
implementation through code generation.
Throughout the domain of embedded and CPS systems,
a new regulatory approach to certification has been advo-
cated [12], based on collecting and reviewing evidence that
the system achieves its goals. Model-driven techniques can
help with the transition to evidence-based certification, from
the current process-based approach. Using compositional mod-
eling techniques and assume-guarantee reasoning may enable
incremental certification, which would allow us to re-certify
MCPS after component upgrades without reconsidering the
whole assurance case from scratch.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The domain of MCPS offers a unique set of challenges,
distinct from any other CPS domain [10]. The area is about
to undergo a substantial transformation, both in terms of
doctors’ and caregivers’ expectations of what MCPS can do
for them, and in terms of how these systems are developed
and approved. The challenges facing MCPS are formidable,
yet they present vast opportunities for research with immediate
practical impact.
In this paper, we summarized the challenges and outlined
the most promising, in our opinion, research directions. Mod-
eling and model-driven engineering, which increasingly take
hold in many other domains, will need to take the leading role
in MCPS development as well.
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